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Abstract -  This paper deals with the emergence of price stickiness, that is nominal price elasticity 
below one, in the wake of nominal shocks. The setting of analysis is a general equilibrium model with 
both ambiguity and rational expectations. Ambiguity and macroeconomics are linked exploiting a 
micro-founded framework. Ambiguity concerns the lack of knowledge of firms about the relationship 
between changes in the aggregated stock of money and in the money distribution across heterogeneous 
consumers in the economy. Ambiguity is represented through a multiple priors approach. It is shown 
that price stickiness can emerge even if a change in the money supply level does not alter the 
distribution of money across consumers (uniform monetary policy). The key assumption made in the 
paper is that attitude towards ambiguity of firms is asymmetric: ambiguity aversion towards uncertain 
positive outcomes (gains) and ambiguity seeking towards negative outcomes (losses). By focusing on 
the dynamics of beliefs following a change in the stock of money that does not alter the money 
distribution, it is shown that money neutrality remains true in the long run. 
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Introduction 
According to some empirical studies (i.e. Greenwald and Stiglitz 1989) price stickiness, that 
is price elasticity below one following aggregated nominal shocks, is a stylised fact. The theoretical 
puzzle (Farmer 1992) is how to reconcile that fact with a standard model based on agents’ rational 
choices. The nominal rigidity topic is, of course, an old one, and has already been tackled in many 
ways: for example by introducing menu costs (Blanchard and Kiyotaky 1987), near rationality 
(Akerlof e Yellen 1985), multiple equilibria (Cooper and John 1988), staggered contracts (Fisher 
1977), information incompleteness (Lucas 1972), and money social externalities (Farmer 1993).  
This paper tries to solve this puzzle through an application of ambiguity theory to 
microfounded macroeconomics. Ambiguity is introduced in a general equilibrium framework, 
inspired by the Lucas’s approach based on information incompleteness. It will be shown how it is 
possible to overcome a critique that, on the empirical ground, has been levelled against Lucas’s 
model. It is argued that, because of readily available information about nominal aggregates, that 
model fails to explain the persistence of price rigidity which data point to (Romer 1996). In the 
present paper information incompleteness is referred to money distribution, that is a much more 
difficult to observe variable than the money stock aggregated level. It is assumed that rational firms 
face an ambiguous problem when they evaluate the impact of monetary policies on the distribution 
of nominal endowments across heterogeneous consumers. In this context, the approach of multiple 
priors is used to model the attitude towards ambiguity, that is firms are supposed to be unable to 
assign a fully reliable additive probability distribution to possible events because they are 
ambiguous. Hence firms have multiple additive priors on possible events and their preferences are 
compatible with either maxmin or maxmax expected utility decision rule.
‡ 
The aim of this paper is to show that asymmetric attitude of firms towards ambiguity can 
explain a lasting phenomenon of prices stickiness even in presence of monetary policies that do not 
alter the nominal endowments distribution among agents.   2
The paper is organized as follows. The concept of a uniform monetary policy is introduced in 
Section 2. In Section 3 the economic framework is presented. Section 4 deals with the relationship 
between ambiguity and price stickiness. Section 5 and 6, respectively, describe the dynamics of 
money distribution and the dynamics of expectations. Concluding remarks are in Section 7. 
 
2. The meaning of a uniform monetary policy 
There are many conditions explaining why prices do not to react proportionally to monetary 
shocks even if agents are assumed to be rational. These conditions refer to the cases in which a 
change in the money stock is either not (believed to be) once for all, or is not immediately 
implemented, or is not fully observed, or does not distribute money in proportion to heterogeneous 
agents’ initial nominal balances (Grandmont 1983). Moreover, creation of money to finance 
government spending in real goods (i.e. the construction of a bridge or a highway) changes the 
economy endowment, and therefore the new money is likely to affect relative prices and the real 
equilibrium. To avoid these issues, in what follows public expenditure is not considered (money is 
supposed to be distributed to consumers directly) and we concentrate on a specific kind of monetary 
policy: a once for all, announced, immediately implemented, observed (in its macro features) and 
proportionally distributed change in the exogenous stock of money. Such policy is labelled a 
“uniform monetary policy”. 
 
3. The economic framework   
Our analysis rests on a very simplified economic framework, to focus on the effect of 
ambiguity about non observable macroeconomic variables on firms’ pricing decisions. It is worth 
remarking that the result of price stickiness is does not depend on the simplifying assumptions 
made. We study a sequence economy of which the per period structure fully retains the standard 
                                                                                                                                                                  
‡ Maxmin (maxmax) expected utility postulates that firms with multiple priors consider the least (most) value of   
expected utility for any act and choose that act for which this least (most) value is greatest.   3
properties (homogeneity of demand and money neutrality under full observability) which should 
characterize our benchmark model to make the introduction of ambiguity significant. 
At any time t population is constituted by a fix number  { } H ... h ... H 1 =  of people belonging 
to H different families. Each person lives for one period only and is replaced by another identical 
member of her family. On the supply side there is a fix number  { } J ... j ... J 1 =  of firms engaged in 
monopolistic competition. Production takes place freely (there are no inputs in the production 
function). Economic agents are subject to a cash-in-advance constraint: they must use money for 
transactions. Timing is as follows. Firms set prices on the basis of the general price level (taken as 
given: we consider a Nash-equilibrium in prices) as well as expected demand. Then demand is 
observed, goods are produced and sold, and profits are paid out. Expectations are assumed to be 
uniform and common knowledge across firms. We work directly with explicit aggregated demand 












    
where n  represents the consumers’ total nominal expenditure and P , Q  are aggregate price level 











2       
Due to the cash-in-advance constraint, consumption is limited by the already accumulated 
monetary endowment. Consumers intertemporal consumption/saving decisions are modelled in a 
very simple way. We assume a specific form of paternalistic intergenerational altruism. At any 
period, the living member of family h  leaves a bequest composed of two parts: the same portfolio 
of firms’ shares she received and a fraction of her nominal endowment. Although this way of   4
modelling the international linkages is somehow arbitrary
§, however it has some useful 
implications: 
  under standard rational expectations money is neutral (there is no price stickiness), and   
therefore the emergence of nominal rigidities is not due to that simplifying assumption; 
  market demand depends straightforwardly on money distribution; 
  there is no market for shares; 
  the analytics of the model is very simple 
To be specific, each consumer h spends a constant fraction  () 1 0,
h ∈ φ  (“disturbed” by a common 
i.i.d. random shock  [] 1 0, ∈ θ ) of her initial monetary endowment, and she leaves the remaining part 
to the next member of her family. All 
h φ s are known by firms. The total nominal demand of agent 
h is 
h h h M n θφ =  
where 
h M s are the initial monetary endowments, not directly observable by firms. 
Then, aggregate nominal expenditure ( ∑ =
h
h n n ) depends on the money distribution index  
∑ = Ω
h
h hM φ  
Given the of expected profits (i.e. revenues) function
** 
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θ       
which, given the assumption of uniform expectations, is the same for each firm. 
                                                 
§ Note that, if the population was constituted by a single person, this behaviour would be inefficient. In fact, any unit of 
money spent for consumption would be totally incorporated in profits and, therefore, it would be entirely available to 
the next component of the same family. Reducing current consumption would not raise the next member’s utility. When 
there are different families, any unit of money saved is passed on to the next family member; if spent, it generates 
profits which are distributed to the next family member proportionally to her stock portfolio.   5








θ 2  
It is now clear that if we assume that expectations are rational (in the Lucas’s sense) and, therefore, 
that  [] Ω = Ω E , the result is that, abstracting from the effects of the purely stochastic disturbance θ , 
following a uniform monetary policy all nominal quantities change proportionally to the money 
supply level and real quantities are unaffected. 
 
4. Ambiguity and price stickiness 
While, for the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that the distribution of the i.i.d. shock (θ ) is 
well known and therefore that expectations about it are formed in the standard way, we suppose that 
imposing standard rational expectations about the not observable impact of monetary policies on the 
money distribution index Ω is questionable. Rather, in the following we assume that agents are not 
ambiguity neutral and that Ω is an ambiguous variable whose value could be deduced only 
indirectly. Remarkably, all the observable signals reveal only  Ω θ , and therefore firms cannot 
disentangle single values (learning about Ω cannot be immediate). In this way we introduce an 
endogenous dynamics originating from both the evolution of the money distribution (Ω) and its 
expected value ( [] Ω E ). This issue will be dealt with later on. Now we concentrate on the 
implications of ambiguity with reference to the effects of a uniform monetary policy in the short 
run. 
We use multiple priors to model ambiguity. Ambiguity is represented by a set of possible 
priors instead of a single one on the underlying state space. This means, as Ellsberg put it, that 
“each subject does not know enough about the problem to rule out a number of possible 
distributions” (Ellsberg 1961, 657). If an agent is ambiguity averse (seeking), she maximizes the 
minimum (maximum) expected utility with respect to each probability in the prior set, thus 
                                                                                                                                                                  
** The specific aggregate demand function assumed guarantees the existence of a well defined maximim revenue being   6
exhibiting maxmin (maxmax) behaviour.
†† In the following, therefore, expectations about θ  are 
intended to be formed according to a single probability distribution while  [] Ω E is defined with 
respect to multiple priors. 
Let  () {} Ω ≡ Γ f  be the set of multiple probability distributions for Ω. An ambiguity averse 
(seeking) agent will choose optimising with respect to the distribution which minimizes 
(maximises) her payoff. In our case, the profit function is what should be maximised. From 
equation [1] it follows that the probability distribution  Γ ∈ f ˆ  which minimises (maximises) the 
expected profit function is simply the distribution which minimises (maximises) the expected value 
of  Ω. Therefore an ambiguity adverse (seeking) agent will choose according to the probability 
distribution that minimise (maximise) the expected value of Ω. 
Let us suppose that the economy is in a long run steady state. The constant (known) value of 
the money distribution index is  0 Ω . At this point a uniform monetary policy is implemented, so that 
the new, constant, level of the stock of money becomes
‡‡  0 1 M M λ =  and  . 0 1 Ω = Ω λ  As already 
stated, firms can only observe that  0 M M λ = , and consider  1 Ω  as an ambiguous variable, described 
by a set of multiple priors  () { } Ω ≡ Γ k f . Let  ( ) k f S  be the support of any  k f . 
We make the following assumptions: 
A1: if firms were ambiguity neutral, their unique probability distribution  ( ) 1 Ω f  would be 
such that  [ ] 0 1 Ω = Ω λ k f | E  
A2: an increase (reduction) in the money supply level does not reduce (increase) the initial 
money endowment of any agent. 
A3: Γ will be such that  [ ] [ ] k k f | E f | E : k , k ′ ′ ′ Ω < Ω < Ω ′ ′ ′ ∃ 1 0 1 λ  
A1 guarantees that, in our framework, if agents are ambiguity neutral, money is neutral. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
concave in  j p  (for given P  and Q ). 
†† See Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989. 
‡‡ Subscripts refer to time (before and after the uniform monetary policy is implemented).   7
A2 means that there is a direct relationship between the money stock and the money distribution 
index. It also implies that if  1 > λ  ( 1 < λ ) then  ( ) k f S min k ∀ < Ω0  ( ( ) k f S max k ∀ > Ω0 ) and, 
therefore  [ ] k f | E ∀ Ω > Ω 0 1  ( [ ] k f | E ∀ Ω < Ω 0 1 ). A2 makes it not necessary to deal with 
pathological cases in which an indirect relationship between the money supply level and aggregate 
nominal demand emerges, making it no longer true that an expansionary (contractionary) monetary 
policy can only be a good (bad) news for firms. 
A3  is formulated in order made not to limit the model to polar relative to the benchmark one, that is 
not to reduce the central role of agents attitude towards ambiguity within the model. 
Under these assumptions, it is firstly supposed that firms are ambiguity averse. We know 
from A3 that profits will be maximised with respect to a probability distribution such that 
[ ] 0 1 Ω < Ω λ E . Therefore, prices will change less than proportionally to the money stock level as a 
result of an expansive policy but they will change more than proportionally as a result of a 
restrictive one. 
A further step is to be taken to explain the  occurrence of price stickiness as a general result. 
In the rest of this Section we motivate the case in which the consequences of an expansionary or 
contractionary monetary policy are evaluated asymmetrically: according to ambiguity aversion or 
ambiguity seeking, respectively.  
In a seminal paper, Kahnemann and Twersky (1979) shows that agents’ preference between 
risky prospects are not linear in probabilities and violate the Expected Utility Theory. Agents tend 
to overweigh small probabilities and to underweigh large probabilities. Namely they transform 
priors into decision weights which measure both the perceived likelihood of beliefs (diminishing 
sensitivity-discriminability) and the preference for gambles (attractiveness).
§§ Kahnemann and 
Twersky pointed out this behaviour within the framework of a Non Expected Utility Theory called 
Prospect Theory. The core of prospect theory as well as its recent generalization-axiomatization   8
called Cumulative Prospect Theory
*** is that agents evaluate possible losses and gains differently. 
Losses and gains are defined with respect to a reference point or neutral outcome. Agents show both 
the possibility effect (lower subadditivity) and the certainty effect (upper subadditivity). Agents 
make decisions based on changes of their monetary endowments rather than on total monetary 
outcomes, thus inducing a sign- and rank-dependent expected utility. As a result, agents have 
inverse-S-shaped utility functions: these are concave for small probabilities and convex for high 
probabilities. This result is consistent with a concave utility function for gains and a convex utility 
function for losses.  
Since attitude towards ambiguity is sign- and rank-dependent, it is appropriate to focus on the 
distinction between good and bad uncertain outcomes, that is gains and losses. We argue that 
attitude towards ambiguity is asymmetric depending on which case prevails.   
Plenty of experimental evidence suggests asymmetry in the attitude towards ambiguity. See 
Cohen et al. (1985), Einhort and Hogart (1990), Wu and Gonzales 1999, Abdellaoui 2000, 
Bleichrodt and Pinto 2000, Bleichrodt et al. 2001, Kilka and Webber 2001. All these papers 
reporting experimental studies indicate that agents treat gains and losses differently. A variety of 
parametric functions are used to elicit individual utility and probability weighing functions for 
represent their behaviour. The common feature of these experimental studies is that the elicited 
utility functions satisfy both upper and lower subadditivity and are consistent with ambiguity 
aversion for gains and ambiguity seeking for losses.  
Because of A2, as long as  1 > λ  ( 1 < λ ) ceteris paribus profits are higher (lower); the extent 
of the variation depends on the actual value of  1 Ω . Moreover, profits are still an increasing function 
of  Ω even assuming that firms know the macro structure of the model and thus they can calculate 
the value of their profit function expecting that, in equilibrium, all firms will charge the same price,. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
§§ Discriminability and attractiveness, respectively, determine curvature (slope) and elevation (intercept) of the inverse-
S-shaped  utility function in the Cumulative Expected Utility. 
*** Tversky and Kahnemann 1992, Wakker and Tversky 1993, Chateauneuf and Wakker 1999.   9
Therefore, an expansionary (contractionary) policy represents a prospect of gain (loss) from the 
point of view of firms.  
Thus, a tendency to show ambiguity aversion for prospective gains and ambiguity seeking for 
prospective losses suffices to bring about price stickiness in the context of a nominal uniform 
monetary policy. Moreover, such theoretical result seems to have some support from empirical 
investigations. 
 
5. The dynamics of money distribution 
As regards money distribution we observe that changes in agent h’s monetary endowment 
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(where Π  are aggregate profits), from which, given that  t t t Ω = Π θ ,  
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φ . To maintain analytics as simple as possible, we linearise ()
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+ − = − + ≅ , then 
() t t t t t M
2
1 1 φ θ φ θ + Ω − = Ω +            [ 2 ]  
Four observations follow equation (2):  
Observation 1  The dynamics of  t Ω  has a steady state (for a constant money supply)  M ˆ φ = Ω that 
does not depend on θ  and is proportional to the money supply level. 
Observation 2 The constant in the linear relationship [2] is positive. The coefficient is positive and 
lower than 1. Therefore, despite the value of  t θ ,  t Ω  converges towards Ω ˆ  at any time t   10
Observation 3 The dynamics of  t Ω  does not depend on expectations about Ω 
Observation 4 Following a uniform monetary policy (
h h M M h λ → ∀ )  Ω jumps to its new steady 
state value. 
 
6. The dynamics of expectations 
Analysis of the dynamics of  [ ] Ω E  is more complex than that of its true value Ω. As 
indicated above, Ω is assumed to be an ambiguous variable, and agents’ expectations are formed 
according to multiple probability distributions. 
Each prior, say  ( ) t t Ω ψ , is updated separately using Bayes rule
†††, but the relevant posterior, say 
( ) t t Ω ϑ , does not constitute a suitable new prior for  1 + Ωt  precisely because of the autonomous 
dynamics of Ω itself according to equation [2]. In fact, given  ( ) t t Ω ϑ ,  1 + Ωt  is a function of two 
(independent) random variables:  t Ω  and  t θ . Therefore, the updating of  ( ) t t Ω ψ  is carried out in two 
steps: the first is being Bayesian updating of (each)  ( ) t t Ω ψ , the second pertains to the calculation of 
the relevant probability distribution of the dependent random variable  1 + Ωt  
Bayesian updating depends on the signal  t π  (the firm’s profits), on the basis of which it is 
possible to calculate  () ( ) ( )
() t t








= Ω  
To obtain the new prior  ( ) 1 1 + + Ωt t ψ , we need to translate the probabilistic assessment over 
t Ω  into one about  1 + Ωt . We first exploit equation [2] (which we write  ( ) t t Ω = Ω + ζ 1 ): 

















t t t t t t |
ζ
ζ ϑ θ η θ ψ  
where  ( ) t θ η  is the probability distribution of  t θ . 
Then, we integrate the last equation with respect to  t θ  to obtain the marginal distribution of  1 + Ωt : 
                                                 
††† We refer to Epstein and Schneider [2001].   11
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Actually, a closer analysis of the dynamics of equation [3] is not needed. In view of our 
goals, it suffices to consider the dynamics  that of the set of admissible values for  t Ω , according to 
agents’ beliefs. Such range is updated according to the two-step procedure described above. 
To be more specific, we now restrict our analysis to a case in which Ω has already 
converged to its steady state value Ω ˆ  (recall that this happens immediately if the perturbing shock 
is a uniform monetary policy).  We do not assume, however, that agents has already learned that. 
Let  [ ] 0 0 0 Ω Ω = Ω ,
~  be the initial support of one of the multiple priors. Since the value of Ω ˆ  is 
always calculable, it must be  [ ] 0 0 Ω Ω ∈ Ω , ˆ . Moreover it must hold that 
{ } { } M max M min h h h h
φ φ ≤ Ω ≥ Ω 0 0 . Then,  0 Ω
~  is first updated after the agents’ observation of the 







 the new admissible range, say  ( ) ( ) [ ] 0 0 0 0 s , s Ω Ω  is such that 
( ) 0 0 0 Ω = Ω s  and  ( ) { } 0 0 0 0 Js , max s Ω = Ω . Without loss of generality we assume  { } 0 0 0 Js , max Js Ω = , 
therefore  ( ) [ ] 0 0 0 0 Ω = Ω , Js s
~  
As for the second step equation [2] is applied to  ( ) 0 0 s
~
Ω  to obtain a new range, say  ( ) 0 1 θ Ω
~ , 
expressed as a function of the (unknown) value
‡‡‡ of  0 θ given by 
() ( ) () ⎥ ⎦
⎤
⎢ ⎣







0 0 1 1 1 φ θ φ θ φ θ φ θ θ  
In general it is  () {} ⎥ ⎦
⎤
⎢ ⎣
⎡ Ω = Ω
≤
t t t z t t , J s max s
~  and  
( ) () { } () ⎥ ⎦
⎤
⎢ ⎣
⎡ + Ω − + − = Ω
≤ + M , M J s max
~
t t t t t t z t t t
2 2
1 1 1 φ θ φ θ φ θ φ θ θ  
                                                 
‡‡‡ To fully define the evolution of the range of integration for  1 Ω
~
, the max and min of  ( ) 0 1 θ Ω
~
 can be calculated 
according to the possible values of  0 θ ; however, such operation is not needed for our purposes.   12
The following proposition shows that the admissible range  t Ω  shrinks to the true value of 
Ω. That demonstrates that, in the limit, perfect learning is eventually achieved; in other words in 
the long run a uniform monetary policy is neutral. 
Proposition 1   { } Ω = ℘
∞ →
ˆ lim t t
 
The proof is in the appendix. 
Of course the speed of convergence of each single prior can be different.   13
7. Concluding remarks 
In this paper we show that an asymmetric attitude of firms towards ambiguity is a sufficient 
condition to generate lasting price stickiness. We assume, on the basis of a growing body of 
theoretical literature and a large amount of experimental evidence, that firms are characterized by 
both lower and upper subadditivity. This assumption is consistent with the hypothesis of ambiguity 
aversion (seeking) with respect to random gains (losses). Such kind of asymmetric attitude towards 
ambiguity is enough to determine price stickiness following a nominal uniform monetary policy, 
since an expansionary (contractionary) policy represents a prospect of gain (loss) in terms of firms’ 
profit.   14
APPENDIX 
Proof of proposition 1 
Upper limit 
We simply observe that the dynamics of  t Ω  mimics that of  t Ω  (see (2)), which converges to Ω ˆ . It 
should be added that  t Ω  moves towards Ω ˆ  from above since  Ω > Ω ˆ 0  and  Ω > Ω ⇒ Ω > Ω + ˆ ˆ t t 1  
Lower limit 
We observe that on the one hand  { } t t z
s max
≤
 is a time-non-decreasing value, and, on the other, that at 
any time t, for given  { } t t z
s max
≤
  t Ω  moves towards  Ω ˆ  (from below), due an analogous argument used 
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